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# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY.

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## GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.

**I**N the summer of 1902 the writer of these lines made a journey to Charlottenburg, to see one of his old and most respected and beloved teachers — Professor Theodor Mommsen, the great German archæologist and historian. It was more a pious pilgrimage than a journey, for we both felt that, at Professor Mommsen's great age, eighty-five, it was hardly probable that we should ever meet again on earth. The interview was long and serious, and took on the form of instruction and advice from the great scholar concerning the problem of the world's civilization. He declared his belief that close friendship and good understanding between Germany, Great Britain and the United States, the three great Teutonic nations, were indispensably necessary to the solution of this all-comprehending problem ; and his parting injunction was : "Preach this doctrine far and near, wherever and whenever occasion will permit." When asked if his view was concurred in by Germany's leading men, he answered unhesitatingly in the affirmative.

It would be too much to say that this exhortation, though coming from one of the world's most learned men, is the sole reason for the appearance of this paper. The writer himself has long held the opinion expressed by Professor Mommsen, and has only become strengthened in it by fuller study and maturer experience. It appears to him that the time has at length arrived for the calm and friendly discussion of this momentous subject;

and such expressions as those of Professor Mommsen — and he has heard many such from Germans of only less note than the great historian — have emboldened him to begin it.

Between the three peoples there is, in the first place, ethnical affinity. The people of Germany, Great Britain and the United States are substantially of Teutonic stock. In a large and general sense, Germany is the motherland of Great Britain, as Great Britain is the motherland of the United States. Moreover, Germany is not merely the motherland of our motherland ; she is in some degree, racially, the immediate motherland of the United States. This ethnical affinity, I grant, does not count for much if it means only that the same blood courses through the veins of the majority of Germans, Englishmen, Scotchmen and North Americans. But if it has produced and maintains a substantial consensus of opinion concerning rights and wrongs, liberty and government, policy and interests, it counts for very much. It has then become an ethical as well as an ethnical bond, and such a bond is the strongest that human history forges. Now who that really knows anything about the history and institutions of Germany, Great Britain and the United States can, for one instant, doubt that such a bond exists between the peoples of these three great countries ; or that the common institutions and ideas that bind them together separate them as distinctly from the Romanic, Celtic and Slavic peoples of Europe, and from all other peoples in other parts of the world, as the waters of the Atlantic are separated from those of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar ?

Let it be noticed, at this early point, that I am careful in drawing these lines. There is a population of some fifteen millions in Sweden-Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, which, taken man for man, is probably the purest Teutonic stock, and the best stock, in Europe. I mean to include them in all that I have to say in regard to the ethnical and ethical affinity among the Germans, Britons and North Americans, and in all that I have to say in regard to the necessity of understanding and co-operation between Germany, Great Britain and the United States in the great work of the world's civilization. Politically they are not great powers, but physically and morally they are a magnificent force, and in connection with the three great Teutonic

powers they can render invaluable service to the spread of Teutonic culture. There are also some fifteen millions more of Teutons in the Swiss Republic and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, who have done most of what has been done for the upbuilding of those states. They also, if properly handled, will prove of great aid in the enterprises of the three Teutonic powers for the extension of civilization.

Now what are these points of ethical and political consensus in which the Teutonic peoples so closely agree, and in which they are so clearly distinguished from all other peoples?

First and most important of all is their high sense of individual worth and of individual rights. From the days of Tacitus to those of Castelar this has been recognized, even by writers of Roman and Romanic blood, as the prime characteristic of the Teutonic peoples. Out of it has sprung their profound respect for individual life and liberty, for the chastity of women and the sacredness of the home, for freedom of thought and of conscience, and for the security of private property—impulses which, as time and thought and experience have given them form in the understanding, have become elaborated into the so-called bills of rights, which are the chief glory of their political constitutions and the realization of which is the chief end of all their governmental arrangements. It is not too much to say that the individual initiative in enterprise, the individual energy in research and the individual conscience in ethical development, which have thus been fostered, sustained and encouraged in these great states, have been the prime forces in the civilization of the modern world. Over against these qualities and principles and institutions are to be found, in the other parts of the world, less respect for human life, individual liberty and individual worth; lower appreciation of woman and the home; less regard for the security of property; paternalism and despotism in government, relieved by periods of temporary anarchy; slavish attachment to precedent, and the ethical and religious conscience crushed beneath the weight of a priestly system of authoritative religion and morals.

In the second place, these three states have reached a substantial consensus of opinion in regard to the principle of local self-

government. Two of them have the system of federal government, constructed and defined by written constitutions ; and in the institutional life and history of the other the custom of local self-government is so firmly embedded that Parliamentary acts are passed to aid its development, but never to destroy it nor even trench upon its proper sphere. The local self-governments are not only the most effective possible instruments for safeguarding local interests and working out sound local policies, but they are the best possible popular seminaries for political training. It is in and through them that latent political talent is best brought to light, disciplined and developed. In contrast with the principle and practice of the Teutonic states upon this subject, almost all the other states of the world govern locally by means of mere official agencies of the central government. Little opportunity is given for any variety of local custom upon matters of even the most minor importance ; and thus little chance is allowed for a variety of experiences in dealing with like subjects, out of which, by a comparison of results, a more intelligent custom or regulation may be attained. The interest of the people in their local government is not only not encouraged, but destroyed ; and political ignorance rather than political education is the outcome of the system.

In the third place, these three great peoples have planted all of their institutions upon the basis of the national state and are developing them through the realization of the national principle. Now the meaning of this is manifold and most important. It means that the boundaries of states shall correspond with the physical boundaries of natural defense and the ethnical boundaries of population. It means that the larger part of the population within the given physical unity has arrived at a consensus of opinion concerning rights and wrongs, interests and policy, and that this larger part has become the real sovereign power within this unity and over this population. It means, therefore, that the state has become really democratic, whatever may be the aspect of its governmental organs, and that the powers of the government are and must be employed for the welfare of the governed and not for the advantage of a governing race or class or caste. It means, lastly, that in the expansion of the power

of such states over other lands and populations the prime purpose is the carrying of the civilization of which they are the organs into the dark places of the earth for the enlightenment and advancement of the inhabitants of these dark places, and that any particular advantage which they themselves may gain from expansion shall be incidental and secondary and shall not conflict with the end which alone justifies and sanctifies the movement. Contrasted with this, the Roman and Romanic genius, when not corrected by a Teutonic element, stands for universal empire, and the Slavic genius stands for universal anarchy. Each of these is a menace in principle to the peace and civilization of the world ; while the system of national states, at the same time that it solves the problems of individual liberty, local government and general government, has produced the system of modern international law, which is gradually establishing and securing the peace of the world.

Lastly, when we regard the finer elements of civilization and culture, science, literature, art and music, we become immediately aware of a conscientious thoroughness, a high moral tone, and a sound and truthful imagination on the one side, and more or less superficiality, looseness and fancifulness on the other. On the whole, I venture to say that, to any profound and thorough student of the world's civilization, the proposition will appear not more and not less than the sober truth that the Teutonic genius and the Teutonic conscience are the two greatest forces in modern civilization and culture.

If this be true, then why should not the three great political representatives of this genius and conscience co-operate in bearing their civilization and culture into the other parts of the world? In the nature of things and in sound principle there is no reason why they should not, and there is every reason why they should. But in the world of fact, petty fact in most respects, there are obstacles to the attainment of this result. The existence of such obstacles is evidenced by a certain hostile feeling between some parts of the population of these great states. In Germany such a feeling is found chiefly among the bumptious and chauvinistic youth ; in the United States chiefly among naval officers and those whom they influence ; and in England, as I am told by

Englishmen of judgment and standing, it is rather general. In Germany, the hostile feeling is directed almost wholly against England ; in England it is directed almost wholly against Germany ; and in the United States it is directed chiefly against Germany. In all three cases it rests largely upon misunderstanding, or upon exaggeration of real grievances.

In Germany, dissatisfaction with England and the English, in so far as it is not attributable to the rather arrogant personal bearing of Englishmen generally, goes back at least to the period when the present Emperor's mother was, as crown princess, working against the Russian-friendly policy of the Emperor William I and Prince Bismarck, and endeavoring to make the new German Empire an ally of Great Britain. It was fresh then in the memory of all Germans that Russia's attitude in the Franco-Prussian war had been of great service to Prussia, and it was felt by all that it would be base ingratitude to turn the back upon Russia by entering into intimate relations with Russia's natural enemy in the Orient. Moreover it was regarded by the German government and the German people as a very dangerous thing for Germany, then just in the process of establishing her newly found unity, to irritate Russia by such a change in her diplomatic relations. The vigorous and continuous insistence of the crown princess — "the English woman" as she began to be called — upon a pronounced Anti-Russian policy, at a moment so inopportune, produced a feeling among almost all classes of the German people that Great Britain would be willing to sacrifice Germany's most vital interests in order to use Germany against Russia. In a sentence, it produced the feeling that Great Britain was unconscionably selfish in her foreign policy. The short reign of the Emperor Frederick and the speedy accession of William II, who held, at first, firmly to the diplomacy of his grandfather and of Bismarck, removed this source of irritation; and the feeling against Great Britain had largely subsided, when the British movements in South Africa and the Boer war revived among the Germans the belief that the British were a wholly selfish people and wanted the whole world brought into colonial subordination to them. The Boers were Teutons, as nearly akin to the Germans as were the English themselves ; and it seemed

to the Germans, from the idealistic point of view, that Great Britain was engaged in an unwarranted encroachment upon well-established rights, and from the point of view of trade and of commerce, that the British were pursuing a policy injurious to Germany's interests in South Africa. The German government, indeed, held itself neutral in the contest ; but there were many manifestations among the German people and in the German press of a hostile feeling against Great Britain. That feeling is, however, now again abating, and in a short time it will be a thing of the past.

The feeling in England against Germany rests chiefly upon resentment against the attitude of the Germans, or rather of a part of the Germans, during the periods and upon the two questions just considered, and upon the commercial rivalry between the two countries. The first may be regarded as temporary and as relatively trivial. The second is more serious. From the condition of a chiefly agricultural country, England has seen Germany advance, during the last thirty years, to the position of a great manufacturing and commercial rival. It is not an easy thing for the old sovereign of the seas and of the world's trade to become accustomed to a competition in the domain which she has so long considered exclusively her own. She has not only been forced to take less for her products and her services in the world's markets and in the world's intercourse, but she has been driven to modify her methods and manners in dealing with other states and other peoples. Now all this is rather galling to British pride and condescension, as well as depleting to British pockets; but it is wonderfully advantageous to the rest of the world, and the Britons will be compelled to see, in the long run, that the existence of such a rivalry, when fairly pursued, furnishes no just cause of complaint or hostile feeling. This too must be set down as a vanishing obstacle to a friendly and intimate relation between Germany and Great Britain.

As I have already indicated, a friendly feeling in Germany toward the United States is, at present, practically universal. I have spent a considerable part of the last three years in that country, and I have heard everywhere and among all classes the earnest desire for good understanding and intimate relations



with the United States, and I have heard nothing in the opposite direction from anybody of any reputation or importance. In the court and governmental circles this desire is most pronounced, earnest and, I fully believe, sincere. During the period of the conflict between the United States and Spain, there was a feeling in Germany that the United States was proceeding rather ruthlessly in the work of seizing the Spanish colonies. Many of the best, purest and most unselfish minds among the Germans were deeply astonished to see the free Republic, the ideal of their thoughts and hope, assuming the rôle of militarism and empire, and, in the height of their emotion, they gave expression to words of rebuke and reproach. Others, not moved by such ideal considerations, had financial interests at stake which appeared to them seriously threatened through the seizure of the Spanish colonies by so great a power as the United States, and they exerted what influence they had to prevent it. The German government, however, preserved its neutral position and discouraged any European coalition in behalf of Spain; and during the past few years the generous treatment of Cuba and the sacrifices made for the inhabitants of the Philippines have taught the German people that the Republic can have colonies and a world policy without becoming a military despotism, and that the honest interests of foreigners are, and will be, better protected throughout the old colonial dominion of Spain by the new sovereign than by the old. There is now scarcely a trace to be observed of the displeasure awakened by the events of 1898.

Down to within the last half-dozen years, the cordial feeling on the part of the people of the United States for Germany had, for a century and more, experienced an almost unbroken development. The high estimation in which Washington and Frederick the Great held each other, and the fact that Prussia alone of all the European powers would enter into a treaty of commerce with the United States during the period of our Confederation, the period of our great weakness and need of foreign friendship, served largely to overcome the hostility against the Germans produced during the Revolution by the acts of the Landgrave of Hesse, and placed the relations between the chief power in Germany and the United States upon the true basis. From that

period to the era of the Civil War in the United States the friendship between the United States and all the states of the German Confederation grew and developed. An extensive immigration from those states into our Northwest had been for some years in progress before the outbreak of the great struggle for civil liberty and national unity. During that terrible crisis in our history, Germans filled, as soldiers, the regiments of the Union and, as officers, drilled and disciplined its forces, and led them to battle and to victory. Their knowledge of military science and tactics was invaluable to the cause of the Union and contributed greatly to the ultimate triumph of the cause. The friendships between Germans and Americans, produced by comradeship in camp and campaign, also served to unite the people of the two countries in the bonds of a better understanding and a stronger affection. To this must be added the very important facts that during the struggle for the existence of the Union, the German states never wavered in their official neutrality, and the German people at home watched with sympathy and pride the loyalty of their kindred to the great cause. They seemed to have a sort of presentiment and prevision that the success of that cause would help powerfully in bringing about the realization of their national ideal for the Fatherland.

From the close of the Civil War began the great exodus of American students to the German universities. Before that time a few notable Americans, such as Everett, Bancroft, Motley, Longfellow and others, had studied in Germany; but by far the greater number of the American students who went abroad to pursue their work went to France or to England. The attitude of France and England toward the cause of the Union during the great crisis repelled the young men of the North from attending their institutions of learning, and the South was too much impoverished by the struggle to send her youth anywhere. From 1870 to the present time, the principal German universities have counted their American students by scores and hundreds; and these men, upon their return to their native land, have gradually taken possession of the professorial chairs in the leading universities of learning in this country. It is no exaggeration to say that the control of the higher education in the United States is

now in the hands of men who have been educated in the German universities, who read and speak the German language, who know the German literature and science, and who entertain a strong affection for the land and people where and among whom they developed their ideals of life and culture. This is a powerful bond of connection between the two countries.

The unfortunate episode in Manila Bay and the anxiety of the German holders of Spanish-Cuban bonds caused in the United States, in certain circles, especially the navy circle, a coolness of feeling towards Germany. This has now, however, given place again substantially to the old cordiality in the minds of most, especially since it has become known that Germany was at that period as much opposed as England to any European coalition against the United States. This correct turn in feeling will become still more pronounced when the actual reason of the conduct of the German admiral in Manila Bay shall be generally known and appreciated. He had not the slightest idea of contesting any plan of the American forces in reference to Manila or the Philippines. He supposed — as all the world supposed and had full reason from our history, our previous policy and our past assurances to suppose — that the United States would never think of making conquest of the Philippines. He supposed that the destruction of the Spanish fleet was the ultimate purpose of the Americans, and that the Spanish and native forces on the land would be left to try conclusions between themselves. There were German interests to be protected in case of such a conflict, and he conceived it to be his duty to place himself in a position to discharge this obligation. This explanation of the admiral's conduct has been made to me so often by Germans of high standing that I am obliged to accept it as the truth. When viewed with the knowledge and under the calmer conditions of the present day, there was absolutely nothing in the attitude of the German government or the German people during the crisis of 1898 which was not entirely compatible with perfectly friendly relations between the two countries; or, at the very worst, nothing which should excite in any fair mind anything more than a passing displeasure.

One of the grounds sometimes alleged in the United States for distrusting Germany is that this power is supposed to intend, if

possible, to establish her authority over certain parts of South America, *viz.*, those parts which, like Southern Brazil, are largely peopled by German immigrants. Such a desire has been expressed by some Germans in Germany; but among the Germans in South America no desire has been shown to be brought under the rule of their mother country. No such scheme has received any sort of encouragement from the German imperial government, nor is any such eventuality now regarded by any Germans of position or influence as within the range of useful political speculation. The idea that Germany is likely to question or attack those American interests that are expressed in the Monroe doctrine is simply a political nightmare. In fact, those interests and that doctrine have never received, in the conduct of any European power, more ample recognition than was accorded by Germany, Great Britain and Italy in 1902, when, before attempting to force Venezuela to pay claims due to their subjects, they assured the United States government that no territorial occupation was intended.

During the greater part of the independent existence of the United States there has been, among its citizens, a prevailing feeling of hostility towards England and the English people. The political and national contest between the two countries, concluded by the treaty of 1783, was followed by a commercial struggle of thirty years, ending in the war of 1812-15. For nearly half a century, the enmity between Britons and Americans grew and developed until the Americans came to regard England as their traditional and natural foe. The policy of the United States, after 1815, to shut itself off from the rest of the world and devote its energies exclusively to its own national development tended to foster this feeling of aversion towards the motherland; and the generation of 1815 had not passed from the stage before the Oregon controversy fanned the smothered fires of hatred against England into flame again. And after the peaceable settlement of this question, not fifteen years elapsed before the attitude of the British government toward the Union in the great crisis of its existence roused once more the wrath of loyal Americans against the offender. The treaty of Washington and the Geneva Arbitration re-established friendly relations between the governments

of the two countries; but the American people, both North and South, only too generally continued to regard Great Britain as a selfish, perfidious and treacherous nation. Nearly twenty years of gradually improving relations, not only between the governments, but also between the people of the two countries, now followed, when, on December 17, 1895, President Cleveland's Venezuela message roused once more the latent anti-British passion in the American heart to a furious and largely senseless outburst. The tact and prudence of the British government saved the world from the terrible scandal of seeing two of the chief bearers of civilization insanely clutching at each other's throats over a matter that was not worth the sacrifice of a single human life to either of them; and once again outwardly friendly relations were re-established. Finally, the clever diplomacy of Salisbury and Chamberlain, during the years 1897 and 1898, produced a cordiality of feeling towards Great Britain among the people of the United States which had never before existed, at least in any such degree. There is little question that their prime purpose in it all was to distract the attention of the United States from the doings of the British in South Africa and to forestall any active sympathy on the part of the United States for the Boer republic in the death struggle which was rapidly approaching. But the republican fanaticism, I do not like to say conscience, of the people of the United States, has become, as the English foresaw, so substantially modified by the new experiences of colonial conquest and rule, that the discovery of the purpose of the extraordinary courtesy and deference of the British government during the conflict between the United States and Spain has had little modifying effect upon the newly established affection of the Americans for their British cousins. In fact we may almost say that the beginnings of an Anglomania are apparent, seen especially in the imitation of British pronunciation and social customs, the playing of British games, and the flocking of American heiresses to the motherland for the very generous purpose of refurbishing, with democratic money, the somewhat faded trappings of British aristocracy. While plain Americans are not exactly edified by such manifestations of good understanding between the two countries, they, or at least those of them who can contemplate things objectively, are

gratified that such an understanding does at last exist; for undoubtedly the most important element in the commercial as well as the diplomatic interests of the United States is close friendship and free and active intercourse with Great Britain.

Resurveying this whole question of reciprocal feeling between the peoples of the three countries, it becomes tolerably manifest that the chief obstacle of this nature in the way of a good understanding between them is the rather dogged and somewhat unreasonable dislike entertained by the English for the Germans. Perhaps it might help the English to put this aside if they should be frankly told that the close friendship which they seem to be assiduously cultivating with the United States can never reach the best result, I might as well say the desired result, if the cost of it to the United States is to be estrangement from Germany; because, besides the sentimental reasons for close friendship between the Germans and the people of the United States which I have already indicated, there exists a practical reason of the very highest political importance. It can best be explained by asking and answering the question: What would the German Empire be compelled to do, if England and the United States should form an alliance leaving Germany out? Anybody who knows anything at all about European diplomacy can answer this question off-hand. Germany would be driven back into the arms of Russia, dragging Austria with her certainly, and Italy probably. The entrance of France into the imagined Anglo-American alliance would be no offset to this, even if it be supposed that France could be induced to take such a step. The supposition is most unlikely, for such a policy would be highly dangerous to France herself. The French cannot afford to do anything which would cement the interests of Russia and Germany. They know that well enough; and in any alignment which would bring Russia, Germany and Austria together, they would almost certainly seek their own safety in unison with the continental powers. In a sentence, an Anglo-American alliance, from which Germany was excluded, would in all probability provoke a counter-alliance of the principal continental states. Great as would be the value to the United States of a close relation with Great Britain, it would still not be sufficiently great to offset the dis-

advantage of such a situation. While I am sure that the Americans are a far more sentimental people than the Europeans believe them to be, I am equally sure that they are an eminently practical people; and they would hardly commit such a practical blunder as to give occasion for the consolidation of continental Europe against American trade and diplomacy. Nor is there, as I have indicated, any sentimental reason for the United States to enter into an alliance with Great Britain unless Germany be included. There is every sentimental reason against it. If Great Britain is our motherland, Germany, as has been already said, is the motherland of our motherland; and when the Americans consent to dwell under the same diplomatic roof with the mother who has chastised them, they are not going to allow the grandmother, who has always taken their part, to be left out in the cold. Interest, sentiment and duty to the world alike require the three countries to come together before any two of them can do so; and the Britons will do well to heed the views and feeling of a very large part of the American people on this subject, lay aside their imagined grievances against the Germans, their natural friends, and cease coquetting with the Romanic peoples, who, if ethnical, social and moral opposition breed enmity, may be called their natural enemies.

It must not be understood, however, that there is nothing in the way of a cordial alliance between the three great Teutonic countries except petty and passing jealousies and largely puerile animosities. There are two very stubborn matters of fact that present the most serious obstacles to such a consummation. I have reserved the discussion of these two matters for the end of this paper, because of their apparently almost insurmountable nature. They are the protective tariff of the United States, and the position and aspirations of Russia, both in Europe and in Asia.

I have no intention of dealing in this paper with the protective tariff as an economic principle, further than to say that it is not abstractly a right principle or a wrong principle, but a policy whose correctness or incorrectness depends upon the circumstances of each country at a given time. There is a time in the history of every state when the protective tariff is a natural, if not neces-

sary, economic arrangement. When a state is in the period of national development; when it is shutting itself off largely from the world and working out its own political and industrial independence, then is the protective tariff natural and desirable, if not absolutely necessary. But after this period has passed, and the particular state has entered upon the next phase and period of its development, the phase of world intercourse and the period of colonial extension, then is the protective tariff an anachronism. It then stands squarely in the way of the accomplishment of the very purpose of purposes for which the state in this phase and period of its development exists, *viz.* world civilization; because the realization of this purpose requires the freest and fullest interchange of things and ideas between each world-state and the rest of the world. Every student of history understands that in the advance from one period to another in the life of a state, the laws, institutions and policies of a preceding period will, for a time, lap over into the succeeding period and create contradictions between the old forms and the new spirit and ideals — contradictions which are, at first, felt rather than seen, but which grow more and more clear in conscious thought until at last they come to be regarded, both at home and abroad, as intolerable abuses. Before this extreme relation is reached between the old and the new, the past and the ever changing present, it is the part of wise statesmanship to see to it that the old shall be transformed by the spirit of the new, so that the laws, institutions, and policies of the state shall keep pace with its ideals in the march of civilization. This is the supreme duty of the state to itself and to the world; and if it does not discharge this duty, it will arouse the world's sense of grievance against it. It is no proper excuse for a state to say that its own interests require the pursuit of an anachronous policy, and it is criminal braggadocio for it to say that it does not care for the feeling and opinion of the world. This is simply to ignore its world duty, for the sake of a particular welfare which, after all, is imaginary. Its true welfare will always go hand in hand with its world duty; and it will proceed upon the path of true progress with much less deviation and delay if it keep its eye upon the ultimate goal for the attainment of which it exists, than if it regard only that por-



tion of the pathway lying just before it. If a state fails to discharge the great world duty of bringing its laws, institutions and policies into line with its own development and with the spirit of the age, it is an offender against the other states of the world; and if its delinquencies cause irritation and ill-feeling in its intercourse with other states, its proper conduct is not to create armies and navies with which to back up its offence, but to modify its laws, institutions and policies — not indeed so as to conform with the selfish interests of other states, but so as to discharge its own high duty to the civilization of the world. Now it does not require any great acumen to see that the persistent high-protective policy of the United States has, in the new period of our world activity, become offensive to the other civilized states of the world, and, in the light of the above principles which I have been endeavoring to expound, justly offensive. Our tariff stands in the way of a good understanding with any of these states. It tends to provoke them to retaliation, and that leads to hostility. It is an obstacle which the United States ought to remove. It is the duty of the United States to the world's civilization to remove it. And the United States cannot complain if displeasure is manifested at its delinquency in the discharge of this duty.

The other real obstacle to an intimate and permanent understanding between the three great Teutonic countries is the position of Russia, which constitutes a perpetual and fearful menace to Germany, Austria, and Sweden-Norway. No one of these states can with safety make any move which might bring down upon it this colossal power. With a population equal to that of all three of these states together, a population in constant unrest and restrained from bursting all political bonds only by an autocratic government which recognizes none of the limitations of conscience and right reason, this Slavic giant stands ready to strike down the Teutonic nations upon its western border at the first movement made by any one of them to escape from its influence and virtual control. It is difficult for the people of the United States to understand this situation. The friendly attitude of the Russian government during our own national struggle with secession and the freeing of the Russian serfs by an edict of the Czar, are the principal facts about Russia known in the

United States, and these facts have created a favorable feeling on the part of the people of the Teutonic republic towards the Slavic empire. Americans do not generally know that this great Muscovite population, with its almost irresistible anarchic spirit and tendencies, is scarcely held in check by a quasi-Teutonic régime at St. Petersburg, to which the states of Western Europe must go in fear and trembling, seeking protection against inundation by Slavic invasion. They do not generally know that Russian friendship for the United States does not rest upon one single element of likeness or one single grain of sympathy between the peoples of the two countries, or upon one single parallel between the political and religious institutions of the two countries, but most largely upon hostility to England, Russia's natural enemy both in power and in civilization. And when they remember with admiration the emancipation of the Russian serfs, they forget that it is one of the oldest devices of royal autocratic politics for the crown to call the masses around itself for the purpose of overcoming the defiance of the nobility. The recent tyrannic proceedings of the Russian government against Finland and its people, depriving them of their historic autonomy and their traditional rights without the slightest preceding disloyalty on their part, has in some degree opened the eyes of the people of the United States to the terrible contradictions in morals, politics and general civilization which obtain between Russia and the civilized states of the world. If the United States has a natural enemy in political principle in the world, that enemy is Russia; and I venture to prophesy, although I know that prophecy is dangerous, that Russia will prove herself, in the next twenty-five years, almost as hostile to the United States as she is now to Great Britain. But the people of the United States have not yet become sufficiently conscious of the Slavic peril to Western civilization to really appreciate the situation of Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian states. A number of times during the last two centuries, half-Teutonic Czars have protected Prussia and Germany against destruction by Slavic Russia. But the power of Muscovite Russia is growing, and no one can say how long the Czar will be able to control the impulses of his Slavic subjects. For Germany, international intimacy with Russia is thus not only

unnatural but unreliable; and yet Germany cannot escape from it, she cannot even show signs of a desire to escape from it, until something equally effective is found to take its place. The same is true of Austria and of Sweden-Norway. One of Austria's richest provinces, Galicia, and the lands of the Lower Danube, are constantly menaced; and it is the general testimony of intelligent travellers of recent years in Sweden-Norway that the gravest apprehension for the future has taken possession of the popular mind in view of the fate of Finland; and yet neither of these states dares to display its distrust or suffer its relations to Russia to become unfriendly. They must all remain quiescent, suffering their own internal political development to be held back by their enforced intimacy with the great despotism which is enthroned over the vast mass of anarchic elements which threatens to overwhelm them. They can do little for the world's civilization in such a situation, in fact they can scarcely maintain their own.

It is entirely evident from all this that Germany dares not make advances for alliance with Great Britain and the United States, much as she may desire it. It is for these two powers, which, chiefly by reasons of geography, stand in an independent position, to take the first step, and to make that step so decisive that the Teutonic states along the Russian border will be safe in accepting their advances. It is the United States above all which is in best position to take the initiative in such a movement. The Slavic peril does not threaten far-off America, while the lines of the British Empire in Asia are within striking distance of the Russian frontier. Moreover, the Americans feel a strong sympathy and maintain a warm friendship with their fellow Teutons on the European continent, while the English are showing their pique against German enterprise in manufacture and commerce by coquetting with the French and cultivating the friendship of the Italians.

As in the case of the protective tariff obstacle, so in the great Slavic obstacle, it is the United States upon which the transcendent duty falls of taking the first steps to bring the Teutons of the world together in the great work of world civilization. It is not only a duty, it is a glorious privilege, a magnificent oppor-

tunity. The leadership in directing such a combination of reason, righteousness and power for the civilization of the world would be a divine appointment in a far higher and truer sense than was ever the tenure of pope, emperor, or king. It would be a mission fitted to rouse the patriotism, self-sacrifice and devoted service of every true man in whose mind and heart the spirit of Teutonic culture has found a resting place. It is to be devoutly hoped that this great country of ours will be able to rise to the occasion, and will allow no national nor even continental narrowness to hold it back from assuming its proper place, the place now fairly within its grasp, at the head of the column of nations in the march of universal progress. There is no danger to the United States in occupying this position. Russia is too far removed from us by land, and is too insignificant upon the sea, to give us any uneasiness. The Romanic states would soon find their own interests substantially in line with those of the great Teutonic combination, simply because its purposes, if realized, would create a world condition in which the true interests of every civilized state would be subserved and enlarged, and in which every uncivilized community would be directed and impelled toward the attainment of a civilized status. A harmony of operation, or a co-operation, between the great Teutonic powers would menace no interest of civilization anywhere. Barbarism has thrown, and probably will again throw, obstacles in the way of their advance; but it has been and will be good for barbarism, whether primitive or luxuriously effete, to be brought under their sway. The sense of justice and of right inherent in the Teutonic conscience has always gone and will always go hand in hand with the enterprising forceful spirit; and the hardness sometimes apparent in the sway of the Teuton would undoubtedly be modified by the co-operation of the three great branches of the Teutonic stock in the enterprises of civilization. In a word, nothing can be seen or apprehended as the natural result of such co-operation except peace, progress, and prosperity throughout the world.

JOHN W. BURGESS.